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Abstract
Let V be a finite society whose members express weak orderings (hence also indif-
ference, possibly) about two alternatives. We show a simple representation formula
that is valid for all, and only, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice
functions on V . The number of such functions is 2n+1 if V contains n agents.
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Representation of anonymous... Introduction
1 Introduction
It is well known, after the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem ([4], [8]), that the two
properties of anonymity and non-manipulability of a social choice function, conflict every
time the collective choice is from among a set of at least three alternatives. Anonymity
guarantees that all individuals of the collectivity are equally powerful in the social choice
determination, whereas non-manipulability (or strategy-proofness) guarantees that telling
the truth is strategically dominant for all individuals. The desirability of both properties
resulted in a large literature that considers, with three or more alternatives, social choice
functions over restricted domains or considers weaker properties to be satisfied by the
collective choice (a classical survey is [1]). At the same time, attention has been paid to
the case, quite common in many important practical situations, in which the society has
to decide by choosing between two alternatives a and b. In the latter, binary, case, if every
voter is asked to declare a strict preference, one has that the anonymous, non-manipulable
social choice functions are all, and only, the quota majority methods (see [7, Corollary
of page 63]), in the sense that they are the n + 2 functions µk, with k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n + 1,
defined as follows. For a profile P = (Pv)v∈V of preferences
1, the corresponding social
choice µk(P ) is a if the number of voters choosing a is at least k, otherwise the collective
choice is b.
This paper deals with the binary setting in which the voters are allowed to express indif-
ference also. We shall describe in this setting all anonymous non-manipulable social choice
functions by means of a representation formula that turns out to be quite simple to de-
scribe and also is a direct extension of the quota majority rule (we call it extended quota
majority). As a straightforward corollary, we shall show that there are 2n+1 anonymous,
non-manipulable, binary social choice functions when the society has n voters.
The fact that, due to the transition from strict to weak orderings, the number of anonymous,
non-manipulable, binary social choice functions depends exponentially on the number of
voters, rather than linearly, suggests that obtaining a sound representation theorem for
weak orderings is not an obvious task. To the best of our knowledge, this problem was
considered only recently in Lahiri and Pramanik ([5, Theorem 2]). In Section 4 we shall
compare the two representations. We point out that ours is not only glaringly a plain
extension of the quota majority method (indeed a sequence of majority rules), but also
can be made optimal in the sense of minimizing the set of the necessary parameters. The
notion of extended quota majority method is quite intuitive. If one applies a quota majority
method µk0 allowing for indifference, except for the cases in which the quota k0 ∈ {0, n+1},
where we get a constant collective choice, there will always be profiles for which the method
does not provide a social choice. Then, the idea is to apply a further quota majority method
µk1 but only to profiles for which µk0 has not given the value. Some more profiles will be
covered, but also the application of the second quota may leave uncovered profiles. Then,
one can apply a µk2, and so on. To ensure that this procedure stops, the sequence of quotas
1In this case every voter v is asked to declare either Pv = a or Pv = b.
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must involve at some point a quota kr ∈ {0, n+1}. It turns out that this is the only way to
produce anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice functions. We go beyond this.
We show that the choice of the quotas can be done in an optimal way, in the sense that
the dimension of the vector k = (k0, k1, . . . , kr) is minimum. We also characterize this by
showing that it happens correspondingly to an up-down course of the sequence like, for
example, the following · · · < k4 < k2 < k0 < k1 < k3 < . . .
In [3] we have given a formula to represent all strategy-proof binary social choice functions,
on an arbitrary set of voters (i.e. not necessarily finite, as we assume here), wherein voters
are permitted to express indifference. We introduced a class of social choice functions, that
we call ψ-type functions, and shown that these are all, and only, the binary social choice
functions that cannot be manipulated. We have seen that some (not all such functions) can
have a simpler structure based on collections of committees (see [3, Remark 2.7, Proposition
2.9]) potentially within the society. A significant example is the simple majority rule ([3,
Proposition 4.3]). The results of this paper extend the exercise for the simple majority rule.
We emphasize that they cannot be seen as straightforward consequences of the general
representation theorem ([3, Theorem 4.2]) obtained in [3]. In particular this is true since
our main result (Theorem 2.7 below) is also a uniqueness result of the representation of
a non-manipulable anonymous social choice function by means of some special extended
quota majority methods that we call proper extended quota majority methods.
The paper proceeds as follows. Next Section presents our results. The third Section
contains all technical details of the needed proofs. Fourth Section concludes by comparing
our representation formula with that proposed by Lahiri and Pramanik in [5].
2 Results
Let V be a society of cardinality n. A profile P = (Pv)v∈V consists of the declarations,
denoted by Pv, of agent v’s preference between the alternatives a and b. The collectivity V
will necessarily implement one of the two alternatives. Since we allow for indifference, the
possibilities for agent v are: to declare preference for a, or for b or to declare indifference
between a and b.
A social choice function (scf, for short) φ is a mapping P 7→ φ(P ), the value φ(P ) being the
alternative selected as the social outcome corresponding to the profile P . Since throughout
the paper we only deal with binary (i.e. only the two alternatives a and b are considered)
scfs, we shall use scf to mean binary scf.
In order to ensure a fair consideration of the opinions of all agents, one may require
anonymity of scfs. Non-manipulability may be required to prevent strategical false dec-
larations. The formal, well established definitions, are:
Definition 2.1 A scf φ is:
2
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anonymous, if φ(P ) = φ(P ◦σ) = φ( (Pσ(v) )v∈V ), for every profile P and for every
permutation σ of V .
non-manipulable, if φ(Pv, P−v) ≻
∼Pv
φ(Qv, P−v), for every voter v, for every pro-
file P , and for every weak ordering Qv.
We introduce now extended quota majority methods, denoted by φk, which can be de-
scribed as follows. Let us call r-tuple, for 1 ≤ r ≤ n + 1, an ordered tuple k =
(k0, k1, . . . , kr) of distinct elements from the set {0, 1, . . . , n+ 1} such that kr ∈ {0, n+ 1}.
For a profile P , let λ(P ) be the smallest index λ for which either at least kλ voters prefer
a, or at least n + 1− kλ voters prefer b.
Given these premises, we give the following definition.
Definition 2.2 A scf is said to be an extended quota majority method if for some
r-tuple k , we have that the scf is defined as follows
φk(P )
def
=
{
a, if at least kλ(P ) voters prefer a,
b, if at least n + 1− kλ(P ) voters prefer b.
Remark 2.3 Notice that:
1. When P is a strict profile, then obviously the index λ(P ) is zero, hence φk(P ) =
µk0(P ), for every k, i.e. the extended method, restricted to strict profiles, gives back
the original quota majority method.
2. It is immediate to recognize that, by Definition 2.2, k0 = n + 1 gives the collective
choice being always b, irrespective of the profiles expressed by the collectivity. Anal-
ogously, if k0 = 0 we get always a as the collective choice irrespective of the profiles
expressed by the collectivity. When 1 ≤ k0 ≤ n, the range of the collective choice is
{a, b}. ✷
Now our first representation theorem can be promptly stated.
Theorem 2.4 Extended quota majority methods φk are anonymous and non-manipulable.
Moreover, every anonymous non manipulable binary social choice function is an extended
quota majority method for some k.
Definition 2.5 We say that the length of k is the smallest index λ for which kλ ∈ {0, n+1}.
The possibility of representing anonymous, strategy-proof scfs as extended quota majorities,
does not ensure uniqueness of the representation. In order to achieve representations that
are also unique, we introduce proper extended quota majorities.
3
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Definition 2.6 We say that an extended majority method is proper if it satisfies one of
the following up and down conditions.
down-up:
0 < kr−1 < ... < k5 < k3 < k1 < k0 < k2 < k4 < k6 < ... < n+ 1 = kr
0 = kr < ... < k5 < k3 < k1 < k0 < k2 < k4 < k6 < ... < kr−1 < n+ 1
up-down:
n+ 1 = kr > ... > k5 > k3 > k1 > k0 > k2 > k4 > k6 > ... > kr−1 > 0
n+ 1 > kr−1 > ... > k5 > k3 > k1 > k0 > k2 > k4 > k6 > ... > 0 = kr
The following figure, illustrates, in a society V of 11 voters, relatively to the function
φk, the properness of the sequence k: the solid line involves a down-up sequence k =
(4, 3, 7, 2, 8, 1, 12) of length 6; the dashed line an up-down sequence k = (4, 5, 3, 7, 1, 12) of
length 5.
The next one, illustrates, in a society V of 11 voters, relatively to φk, the properness of the
sequence k: the solid line involves a down-up sequence k = (7, 6, 8, 5, 10, 3, 11, 0) of length
7; the dashed line an up-down sequence k = (4, 7, 3, 9, 0) of length 4.
4
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Our main results is the following.
Theorem 2.7 For every onto binary social choice function φ which is anonymous, and
non-manipulable there exists one and only one proper extended quota majority method φk
such that φ = φk.
Because of Theorems 2.4 and 2.7, the following is now obvious.
Corollary 2.8 The onto scfs that are anonymous, and strategy-proof are all, and only, the
proper extended quota majority methods.
To determine the cardinality of the class of all anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social
choice functions in a society with n agents, we can count the extended quota majority meth-
ods. Indeed we count that there are 2n anonymous, non-manipulable scfs corresponding to
the collective choice b for the unanimous indifference. Symmetrically, there are 2n anony-
mous, non-manipulable scfs corresponding to the collective choice a for the unanimous
indifference.
To see the first statement, let us take a subset J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. If J is empty, let us associate
J with the constant scf b. Suppose J is nonempty and has cardinality r. In this case we
associate J with the scf φ(k0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1) where the proper k presents:
kr−1 = min J, kr−2 = max J \ {kr−1}, kr−3 = min J \ {kr−1, kr−2},
kr−4 = max J \ {kr−3, kr−2, kr−1}, . . . , k0 =
{
max J \ {k1, . . . , kr−1}, if k1 is a min
min J \ {k1, . . . , kr−1}, if k1 is a max.
Theorems 2.4 and 2.7 guarantees that the correspondence defined above is a bijection.
Hence by symmetry, we have proved the following.
Corollary 2.9 There are 2n+1 anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice func-
tions if n voters choose between two alternatives, being allowed to express indifference.
Remark 2.10 A few comments are in order.
1. Definition 2.2 con be formally given with reference to an arbitrary sequence j =
(j0, j1, ...). The only needed condition is that at least one of its values belongs to
{0, n + 1}. When 1 ≤ j0 ≤ n, if r is the smallest index for which jr ∈ {0, n + 1},
the original sequence j and the truncated sequence (j0, j1, ..., jr) give rise to the same
scf. In this case, jr = n+1 corresponds to assign b to the profile where all agents are
unanimously indifferent. An analogous comment applies when jr = 0 replaces n+ 1,
in that case a replaces b.
2. Let φh, h = (hλ)λ∈{0,...,} be defined with the help of an arbitrary sequence. If we
have hβ ≥ hγ ≥ hα for indices α, β < γ, then φh does not change if we remove hγ
from the sequence h 2. The deletion of hγ is possible even if we have hβ ≤ hγ ≤ hα
(or hβ = hγ) for indices α, β < γ.
2 It is sufficient to observe that the index of a profile P does not change if we remove hγ . Indeed it is
obvious that the index λ(P ) cannot be γ.
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3. By applying to the truncated sequence (j0, j1, ..., jr) above the deletion of the repeated
indices, we recognize that the scf given by the formula of Definition 2.2 applied to an
arbitrary j produces an extended quota majority method. ✷
Definition 2.11 We say that a representation of a scf φ as an extended quota majority
method is minimal if it has minimum length among all such representations of φ.
We close this Section by observing that
Corollary 2.12 A representation is proper if and only if it is minimal.
The following example illustrates some of the concepts and it is relevant for Remark 3.13
Example 2.13 In this example, to modify the status quo (say, b) to the new status (say, a),
the society V = {1, . . . , 11} needs that at least two individuals wish doing that. However,
if such individuals are no more than four, it is needed also that the voters in favor of
maintaining the status quo are less than seven.
The model for this situation is the scf φ defined as follows:
φ(P ) = a if either |D(a, P )| ≥ 5 or 2 ≤ |D(a, P )| < 5& |D(b, P )| < 7. In all the other
cases φ(P ) = b.
According to Remark 2.10, for such a φ possible defining sequences are (5, 2, 7, 12),
(5, 2, 9, 12), (5, 2, 12), the latter being the proper representation. ✷
3 Proofs
The investigation of the scfs which are non-manipulable relies (see [6], [5], [3]) on the so-
called committees and their duals. A committee is, by definition, a nonempty, closed
under superset, familiy of coalitions that can be formed in the society V . We are particularly
interested in families Gk = {E ⊆ V : |E| ≥ k} for k = 1, . . . , n. The superset closed family
dual3 to Gk is G
◦
k = {E ⊆ V : |E| ≥ n+ 1− k}, i.e. Gn+1−k.
Let V = {Gk : k = 1, . . . , n} be the set of all such committees on V that we refer to as
committees of of cardinal type k. A synonym is superset closed family (SSCF,
for short) of cardinal type k. It will be convenient to consider the power set of V and
the empty subset of the power set of V also as committees. They can be considered as of
cardinal type respectively zero (G0 = 2
V ) and n+1 (Gn+1 = Ø). They are also dual to each
other.
We shall also consider, given a subsets I of V with cardinality ℓ, (0 ≤ ℓ < n), SSCFs F
on Ic = V \ I of cardinal type. If we suppose that the type of F is k (necessarily we have
3We remind from [3], where the notion has been introduced, that the dual of a committee F is the
committee F◦
def
= {E ⊆ V : V \ E /∈ F}.
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1 ≤ k ≤ n− ℓ), the corresponding dual (with respect to Ic) family is also of cardinal type
and has type m = n− ℓ− k + 1.
By comparing Definition 2.2 with [3, Remark 3.3], it is evident that:
Remark 3.1 An onto extended quota majority method φk, k = (k0, k1, ..., kr), is a scf of
the form (see [3, Remark 3.3]) φF , x , where x is either a or b according to the fact that the
first ki /∈ {1, . . . , n} is either 0 or n + 1, and the collection F consists of the committees
Gk0 , . . . ,Gki−1 .
The above Remark and [3, Proposition 3.4] tell us that extended quota majorities are non-
manipulable scfs. Anonymity being obvious, we have the first part of Theorem 2.4. We shall
prove the second part, namely that every anonymous, non manipulable scf is an extended
quota majority method, in subsection 3.3. The fact that extended quota majority methods
admit proper representations and that the proper representation is unique for onto scfs, is
discussed in the subsection that follows.
3.1 Existence and uniqueness of proper representations
Throughout the sequel of the paper we adopt the following notation: by D(a, P ), D(b, P ),
and I(P ) we denote the subsets of V consisting of voters that, respectively, choose a, b or
are indifferent between the two alternatives.
Proposition 3.2 Let φj , j = (jλ)λ∈{0,...,r}, be an onto extended quota majority method.
There is one and only one proper (sub)sequence k of j such that φj = φk.
proof:
We shall first show the existence of k. Without loss of generality we can assume that
{j0, j1, . . . , jr−1} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
We shall describe a procedure that, through the deletion of suitable indices j’s, produces
the proper representation φk of φj . The initial element k0 of k is set to be j0.
We discuss the case j1 > k0. The case j1 < k0 can be discussed in a similar way.
Let us partition the sequence defining φj as illustrated in the following figure
j1, ..., ji1−1 ji2 , ..., ji3−1
k0 ...
ji1 , ..., ji2−1 ji3 , ..., ji4−1
The indices i1, i2, . . . are defined as follows:
i1 = min{i > 1 : ji < j0}; i2 = min{i > i1 : ji > j0}; i3 = min{i > i2 : ji < j0}; . . .
One can adopt the usual convention that the minimum of the empty set is ∞ and once
ih =∞ the sequence of indices i’s stops. The top row contains values of (cardinalities) j’s
bigger than k0, the bottom one smaller than k0
7
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Let k1 be defined as the maximum of {j1, ..., ji1−1}. It is a straightforward calculation to
verify that φj = φk0,k1,ji1 ,...,ji2−1,...,jr .
Let k2 be defined as the minimum of {ji1 , ..., ji2−1}. It is a straightforward calculation to
verify that φj = φk0,k1,k2,ji2 ,...,ji3−1,...,jr .
If one of the values in the set {ji2 , ..., ji3−1} is smaller than k1, due to Remark 2.10, such
value can be deleted without modifying the scf φj . Therefore, we can assume we are in a
situation like this:
k2 < k0 < k1 < {ji2 , ..., ji3−1}.
Let k3 be defined as the maximum of {ji2 , ..., ji3−1}. It is a straightforward calculation to
verify that φj = φk0,k1,k2,k3,ji3 ,...,ji4−1,...,jr .
If one of the values in the set {ji3 , ..., ji4−1} is bigger than k2, due to Remark 2.10, such
value can be deleted without modifying the scf φj . Therefore, we can assume we are in a
situation like this:
{ji3 , ..., ji4−1} < k2 < k0 < k1 < k3.
Let k4 be defined as the minimum of {ji3 , ..., ji4−1}. It is a straightforward calculation to
verify that φj = φk0,k1,k2,k3,k4,ji4 ,...,,...,jr . We continue this way till we produce a proper k
giving the same scf.
We shall now see the uniqueness. For a scf φ giving value b for unanimous indiffer-
ence, suppose that we have two proper representations φk = φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1 and φh =
φh0,h1,...,hs−1,n+1. We shall show first that k0 = h0, then k1 = h1, k2 = h2, and so on.
Afterwords we show that also the lengths coincide. We shall write n− k + 1 as k◦.
To see k0 = h0:
Suppose, without loss of generality, that k0 < h0. Let P be a profile with |D(a, P )| = k0
and |D(b, P )| = h◦0. By using the k-representation, we get that the social choice is a. By
using the h-representation, we get that the social choice is b and this is a contradiction.
To see k1 = h1:
Suppose, without loss of generality, that k1 < h1. We shall consider the following three
cases: k0 < k1 < h1, k1 < k0 < h1, k1 < h1 < k0, obtaining for everyone a contradiction
to the assumption that φk = φh.
When k0 < k1 < h1, since k is proper, we have necessarily · · · < k2 < k0 < k1 < h1. Let
P be a profile with |D(a, P )| = k0 − 1 and |D(b, P )| = h
◦
1. Along k the index of P is two
and the value of φ(P ) is a. Along h the index of P is one and the value of φ(P ) is b, a
contradiction.
For the other two cases k1 < k0 < h1, and k1 < h1 < k0, let us consider a profile P with
|D(a, P )| = k1 and |D(b, P )| = k
◦
0 − 1. By using the k-representation, we get that the
social choice is a. By using the representation φ = φk0,h1,...,hs−1,n+1, we get that the social
choice is b and this is a contradiction.
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To show that φk0,h1,...,hs−1,n+1(P ) = b, in the case k1 < k0 < h1, since k
◦
0 − 1 ≥ h
◦
1, clearly
φk0,h1,...,hs−1,n+1(P ) = b. In the case k1 < h1 < k0, since the index of the profile P cannot
be zero, first notice that it is also not one. Indeed, not only |D(a, P )| < h1, but also
|D(b, P )| = n− k0 < n− h1 < h
◦
1. Since h is proper, we have k1 < h1 < k0 < h2, and the
index of P is two: |D(b, P )| = n− k0 > n− h2 ⇒ |D(b, P )| ≥ h
◦
2.
We can now suppose, without loss of generality, that we are in a situation like the following
· · · < k5 < k3 < k1 < k0 < k2 < k4 < k6 < . . .
· · · < h5 < h3 < k1 < k0 < h2 < h4 < h6 < . . .
After having proved, for i ≤ min{r − 1, s − 1}, that kλ = hλ for λ < i, we prove by
contradiction that ki = hi. As in the previous steps, let us assume that ki < hi.
We have
φk0,k1,...,ki−1,ki,...,kr−1,n+1 = φk0,k1,...,ki−1,hi,...,hs−1,n+1
and one of the following two cases.
Case 1:
ki+1 < ki−1 < ... < k1 < k0 < k2 < ... < ki−2 < ki
∧
hi+1 < ki−1 < ... < k1 < k0 < k2 < ... < ki−2 < hi
Let P be a profile with |D(a, P )| = ki−1−1 and |D(b, P )| = h
◦
i . By using the representation
φ = φk0,k1,...,ki−1,hi,...,hs−1,n+1, the index of the profile is i and the social choice is b.
By using the representation φ = φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1, we get that the social choice is a and this
is a contradiction. To show that φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1(P ) = a, notice that i < r − 1 otherwise
we would have both kr−1 and kr = n + 1 on the right of k0 against the properness of the
representation. We see now that with respect to the representation φ = φk0,k1,...,kr,n+1 the
profile has index i+ 1 and the social choice is a.
Case 2:
ki < ki−2 < ... < k1 < k0 < k2 < ... < ki−1 < ki+1
∧
hi < ki−2 < ... < k1 < k0 < k2 < ... < ki−1 < hi+1
Let P be a profile with |D(a, P )| = ki and |D(b, P )| = k
◦
i−1 − 1. By using the represen-
tation φ = φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1, we get that the social choice is a (index is i). By using the
representation φ = φk0,k1,...,ki−1,hi,...,hs−1,n+1, we get that the social choice is b and this is a
contradiction. To show that φk0,k1,...,ki−1,hi,...,hs−1,n+1(P ) = b, since the index of the profile
P with respect to this representation cannot be less than i, first notice that it is also not
i. Indeed, not only |D(a, P )| < hi, but also |D(b, P )| = n− ki−1 < n− hi < h
◦
i .
9
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If s−1 > i, along the sequence k0, h1, . . . , hs−1, the index of P is i+1: |D(b, P )| = n−ki−1 >
n − hi+1 ⇒ |D(b, P )| ≥ h
◦
i+1. If s − 1 = i, then the index is s. In both cases the value of
the social choice is b as announced.
The indices r and s coincide.
Suppose r > s, then necessarily we have a situation as the following
kr−1 < ... < ks+1 < ks−1 < ks−3 < ... < k1 < k0 < k2 < ... < ks−2 < ks < ... < kr = n + 1
ks−1 < ks−3 < ... < k1 < k0 < k2 < ... < ks−2 < hs = n + 1
If we take a profile P |D(a, P )| = ks−1 − 1 and |D(b, P )| = 0. By using the representation
φ = φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1, we get that the social choice is a (index s + 1). By using the repre-
sentation φ = φk0,k1,...,ks−1,n+1, we get that the social choice is b and this is a contradiction.
✷
proof of Corollary 2.12:
Let us take a representation φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1 of φ whose length is minimum and suppose
that it is not proper. Let us suppose that k1 > k0, since a similar argument can be given if
the reverse inequality holds true. Since the representation is not proper, we shall have for
some index i ≥ 1 either the condition:
ki−1 < ... < k2 < k0 < k1 < ... < ki and ki+1 > ki−1,
or the condition
ki < ... < k2 < k0 < k1 < ... < ki−1 and ki+1 < ki−1.
In the first case the deletion of the smallest between ki and ki+1 still produces a represen-
tation of φ. In the second case the deletion of the largest between ki and ki+1 still produces
a representation of φ. Hence φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1 is not of minimum length. For the converse,
namely, to show that every proper representation is minimal, if φk0,k1,...,kr−1,n+1 is a proper
representation of φ, by the uniqueness Theorem, it must be necessarily minimal. 4 ✷
3.2 Subsets of profiles
We shall introduce here some useful subsets of the set P of all profiles.
Definition 3.3 Let the natural numbers ℓ, k,m be such that 0 ≤ ℓ < n, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− ℓ,
m = n − ℓ − k + 1.5 Let I be a subset of V with cardinality ℓ, and F a SSCF on Ic of
cardinal type k (with respect to Ic).
4Minimal representation obviously exist and we have just seen they are proper.
5The fact that the numbers ℓ, k and m (possibly indexed) will be always such that 0 ≤ ℓ < n, 1 ≤
k ≤ n− ℓ, m = n− ℓ− k + 1, will be assumed throughout the sequel of the paper.
10
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1. The sets Pa(ℓ, k) and P b(ℓ, k):
P ∈ Pa(ℓ, k)
def
⇔
{
|D(a, P )| ≥ k,
|D(b, P )| < m.
P ∈ Pb(ℓ, k)
def
⇔
{
|D(a, P )| < k,
|D(b, P )| ≥ m.
2. The sets Pa(I,F) and Pb(I,F):
P ∈ Pa(I,F)
def
⇔
{
|D(a, P ) ∩ Ic| ≥ k,
D(b, P ) ⊆ Ic.
P ∈ Pb(I,F)
def
⇔
{
D(a, P ) ⊆ Ic,
|D(b, P ) ∩ Ic| ≥ m.
In the particular case of I = Ø (i.e. ℓ = 0) we shorten Pa(Ø,Gk) as Pa(Gk) and
Pb(Ø,Gk) as Pb(Gk).
6
3. P(ℓ, k)
def
= Pa(ℓ, k) ∪Pb(ℓ, k), and P(Gk)
def
= Pa(Gk) ∪Pb(Gk).
Trivially, the sets Pa and Pb are disjoint.
The profiles belonging to Pa(ℓ, k) have a stucture that can be also described as in the next
proposition. Indeed, if we take a profile P ∈ Pa(ℓ, k), we can certainly fix a subset of
D(a, P ) with cardinality k. Let us call V1 such a set. Call V2 a subset of V \ V1 which is a
superset of D(b, P ) with cardinality n − ℓ − k = m − 1. Finally, define I = V \ (V1 ∪ V2)
(the cardinality of I is ℓ). Hence, the profile P looks like in the following figure
Ia I∼ V ∼2 D(b, P ) V
a
2 V1
Profile P top a {a, b} {a, b} b a a
V2
I Ic
I(P )
where the sets Ia, V a2 , I
∼, V ∼2 may be empty and D(a, P ) = I
a ∪ V a2 ∪ V1. Similarly we can
do for a profile P ∈ Pb(ℓ, k). Therefore, the following proposition is proved.
Proposition 3.4 The following equations hold true:
Pa(ℓ, k) =
⋃
σ
Pa(σ(I), σ(F)),
6 Hence: P ∈ Pa(Gk) means |D(a, P )| ≥ k, and P ∈ Pb(Gk) means |D(b, P )| ≥ n− k + 1.
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Pb(ℓ, k) =
⋃
σ
Pb(σ(I), σ(F)),
where: σ runs over all permutations of V, I is a subset of V with cardinality ℓ, F is the
SSCF on Ic of cardinal type k (with respect to Ic).
Since Gℓ+k ⊆ Gk and dually G
◦
ℓ+k ⊇ G
◦
k , we also have the next proposition.
Proposition 3.5
P ∈ Pa(ℓ, k)⇔
{
D(a, P ) ∈ Gk,
D(b, P ) /∈ G◦ℓ+k
⇔ P ∈ Pa(Gk) \Pb(Gℓ+k),
P ∈ Pb(ℓ, k)⇔
{
D(a, P ) /∈ Gk,
D(b, P ) ∈ G◦ℓ+k
⇔ P ∈ P b(Gℓ+k) \Pa(Gk).
We conclude by presenting the definition of a scf that will be useful for an intermediated
step in the completion of the proof of Theorem 2.4. Given a sequence 〈ℓ,k〉 = (ℓλ, kλ), for
λ ∈ Λ = {0, 1, 2 . . . , |Λ|}, we say that a profile P has index λ(P ) if λ(P ) is the smallest
index λ for which P ∈ Pλ
def
= P(ℓλ, kλ). This notion replicates, mutatis mutandis, the one
preceding Definition 2.2 (see also [3, Definitions 3.1 and 3.2]).
Definition 3.6 Given x ∈ {a, b}, and the sequence 〈ℓ,k〉 = (ℓλ, kλ), where λ ∈ Λ =
{0, 1, 2 . . . , |Λ|}, we define the following scf:
ψ〈ℓ,k〉, x(P ) =


a, if P ∈ Pa(ℓλ(P ), kλ(P ))
b, if P ∈ Pb(ℓλ(P ), kλ(P ))
x, if P /∈ (
⋃
λ∈Λ Pλ).
Remark 3.7 With reference to Definition 3.6, if we adopt, for λ = 0, 1, 2, ..., |Λ|, the
following shorter notation: ψλ
def
= ψ〈(ℓ0,...,ℓλ),(k0,...,kλ)〉,x, we can notice that, obviously,
on P0 we have ψ0 = ψλ, ∀λ ≥ 0. On P1 \ P0 we have ψ1 = ψλ, ∀λ ≥ 1. ... On
Pα\(
⋃
β<αPβ) we have ψα = ψλ, ∀λ ≥ α; OnP\(
⋃
λ∈Λ Pλ) we have ψλ(·) = x, ∀λ ∈ Λ.
For the definition of the SCF φG, x employed in the following proposition we refer to [3,
Remark 3.3].
Proposition 3.8 Assume for the sequences (ℓλ, kλ)λ∈Λ (with Λ = {0, 1, . . . , |Λ|}) that k
is decreasing and ℓ + k is increasing.
The scf ψ〈ℓ,k〉, x is identical to the scf φG, x where the collection G is:
G =


Gk0 ,Gℓ0+k0,Gk1,Gℓ1+k1,Gk2 ,Gℓ2+k2, . . . ,Gk|Λ| ,Gℓ|Λ|+k|Λ| , ifx = a
Gℓ0+k0 ,Gk0,Gℓ1+k1 ,Gk1,Gℓ2+k2,Gk2, . . . ,Gℓ|Λ|+k|Λ| ,Gk|Λ| , ifx = b
being the committees constituting G, to be considered in the order from left to right described
in the above formula.
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Remark 3.9 Before giving the proof we observe that we are saying, on the base of Remark
2.10, that ψ〈ℓ,k〉, x is the extended quota majority method defined:
by the sequence (k0, ℓ0 + k0, k1, ℓ1 + k1, k2, ℓ2 + k2, . . . , k|Λ|, ℓ|Λ| + k|Λ|, 0), if x = a,
by the sequence (ℓ0 + k0, k0, ℓ1 + k1, k1, ℓ2 + k2, k2, . . . , ℓ|Λ| + k|Λ|, k|Λ|, n+ 1) if x = b. ✷
proof: Let us shorten the notation for the two functions, by using simply ψ and φ. Also,
according to our notation, m (possibly indexed, as it is now) is n− ℓ− k + 1.
We show that for every profile P , we have φ(P ) = ψ(P ).
Notice that
Pa(Gℓ+k) ⊆ Pa(Gk); and Pb(Gk) ⊆ Pb(Gℓ+k).
To prove that the two scfs coincide on P we distinguish two cases. Let us consider first
the case that P ∈
⋃
λ∈Λ Pλ. Suppose that λ is the index of the profile P . We have either
P ∈ Pa(ℓλ, kλ) or P ∈ Pb(ℓλ, kλ), respectively giving ψ(P ) = a or ψ(P ) = b. We show
that correspondingly φ attains the same value on P .
Case P ∈ Pa(ℓλ, kλ).
Since by Proposition 3.5, Pa(ℓλ, kλ) = Pa(Gkλ) \ Pb(Gℓλ+kλ) ⊆ [Pa(Gℓλ+kλ) ∪ Pa(Gkλ)] \
Pb(Gℓλ+kλ), if we prove that P does not belong to P(Gℓβ+kβ)∪P(Gkβ) whenever β < λ, we
shall have that φ(P ) = a. In other words we have to exclude that P belongs to one of the
following four sets: Pa(Gℓβ+kβ) ⊆ Pa(Gkβ), Pb(Gkβ) ⊆ Pb(Gℓβ+kβ).
We show that P /∈ Pb(Gℓβ+kβ).
Suppose the contrary, then |D(b, P )| ≥ mβ. On the other hand since P /∈ Pb(Gℓλ+kλ), we
have |D(b, P )| < mλ against the assumption that m is decreasing.
Now we can show that P /∈ Pa(Gkβ). Indeed, if not by Proposition 3.5 we have P ∈
Pa(ℓβ + kβ), against the definition of index.
Case P ∈ Pb(ℓλ, kλ).
By Proposition 3.5 P ∈ [Pb(Gℓλ+kλ) ∪ P(Gkλ)] \ Pa(Gkλ). An argument similar to the
previous one applies. If the index β is less than λ, the profile P cannot belong to Pa(Gkβ)
otherwise the monotonicity of k is violated. Now, the profile cannot be in Pb(Gℓβ+kβ),
otherwise it belongs to Pb(ℓβ + kβ), against the definition of index.
It remains to consider the case that P /∈
⋃
λ∈Λ Pλ.
In this case the value of ψ(P ) is x, and we show that even φ(P ) is x. We have to investigate
the case that P ∈
⋃
λ∈Λ[P(Gkλ)∪P(Gℓλ+kλ)], since in the opposite case the assertion comes
from the definition of φ. So, let us suppose that P ∈
⋃
λ∈Λ[P(Gkλ) ∪P(Gℓλ+kλ)] and let α
be the first (moving from left to right in the definition of G) index such that P ∈ P(Gα).
We are done if we show that
x = a⇒ P /∈ Pb(Gα).
Indeed, if this is not the case, P ∈ Pb(Gα). But α is either some kλ or an ℓλ + kλ and in
both cases we can write P ∈ Pb(Gℓλ+kλ). Since P /∈
⋃
λ∈Λ Pλ, by Proposition 3.5 we must
have P ∈ Pa(Gkλ). Hence α = kλ and P ∈ Pa(Gα) ∩Pb(Gα), a contradiction.
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Similarly, we can show that
x = b⇒ P ∈ Pb(Gα),
and we are done. ✷
3.3 Anonymous, non manipulable scfs are extended quota ma-
jority methods
First we see that committees of cardinal type arise when anonymous scfs are considered.
Compare indeed next proposition with [3, Proposition 4.1]. We recall that the committees
of cardinal type on V are V = {Gk : k = 1, . . . , n}, Gk = {E ⊆ V : |E| ≥ k}. We also
consider the power set of V and the empty subset of the power set of V as committees of
cardinal type respectively zero (G0 = 2
V ) and n+ 1 (Gn+1 = Ø).
Proposition 3.10 Let φ be a non-manipulable scf. If φ is anonymous, the (unique) com-
mittee F such that for every profile P one has
D(a, P ) ∈ F ⇒ φ(P ) = a, and D(b, P ) ∈ F◦ ⇒ φ(P ) = b,
is of cardinal type.
proof:
If we denote by ̺(F) the least cardinality of the coalitions belonging to F , we have to
prove that
|F | ≥ ̺(F)⇒ F ∈ F .
Let D ∈ F be such that |D| = ̺(F).
Let E ⊆ F be such that |D| = |E|. Then take a permutation σ of V such that the σ-image
of E is D.
Take a strict profile S that ranks a as top on D and b as top on Ec. We hence have
φ(S) = a.
Let Q be the profile S ◦ σ, i.e. Qv = Sσ(v). Because of anonymity and since Q is strict, we
have that D(a,Q) ∈ F .
Clearly v ∈ D(a,Q) is same as σ(v) ∈ D(a, S) = D, which is the same as v ∈ E. So E is
in F and therefore the superset F too is in F . ✷
In the above proposition F ∈ V when φ is onto. F ∈ {G0,Gn+1} for the constant scfs a
and b respectively.
The following is the crucial step to obtain the results presented in Section 2.
Theorem 3.11 Let φ be a scf which is onto, anonymous, and non-manipulable. Say x is
the collective choice corresponding to the unanimous indifference.Correspondingly, we can
find a sequence 〈ℓ,k〉 = (ℓλ, kλ)λ∈Λ such that:
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1. the sequence ℓ is strictly increasing and ℓ0 = 0,
2. in case x = b (respectively, x = a), the sequence k is strictly decreasing (respectively,
decreasing) and the sequence ℓ + k is increasing (respectively, strictly increasing).
3. φ = ψ〈ℓ,k〉, x.
proof: For the proof, we shall go along steps that echo those for proving [3, Theorem 4.2].
However, a deeper argument is needed to achieve the result.
We remind that once the sequences ℓ and k are given, the sequence m is also fixed for the
dual committees. We also remind the notation introduced in Remark 3.7.
Due to Proposition 3.10, let F0 be the SSCF on V of cardinal type, say k0, such that
|D(a, P )| ≥ k0 ⇒ φ(P ) = a, and |D(b, P )| ≥ n− k0 + 1⇒ φ(P ) = b.
Set: I0 = Ø, ℓ0 = |I0|, m0 = n− ℓ0 − k0 + 1, P0 = P(ℓ0, k0).
Clearly on P0 we have that φ = ψ〈ℓ0,k0〉,x = ψ0, hence, if the set of profiles {P /∈ P0 :
φ(P ) 6= x} is empty, the theorem is proved, being 〈ℓ0, k0〉 the desired sequence. So, let
us suppose it is nonempty and let P 1 be one of its members with I(P 1) =: I1 of smallest
cardinality, that we denote by ℓ1. By definition 1 ≤ ℓ1 < n.
Applying Proposition 3.10 to the scf defined for the society Ic1 as follows:
PIc
1
−→ φ([∼I1 , PIc1 ]),
we determine a SSCF F1 on I
c
1 of cardinal type (with respect to I
c
1), say k1 , such that,
with m1 = n− ℓ1 − k1 + 1,
(+) |D(a, P )∩ Ic1| ≥ k1 ⇒ φ([∼I1 , PIc1 ]) = a, and |D(b, P )∩ I
c
1| ≥ m1 ⇒ φ([∼I1 , PIc1 ]) = b.
Set P1 = P(ℓ1, k1).
Notice that if for a profile P we have I(P ) = I1, necessarily it is true that P ∈ P1.
Since P 1 ∈ P1 \P0, we must have |D(a, P
1)| < k0 and |D(b, P
1)| < m0.
To fix ideas, let us assume, throughout the sequel, that x = b. The argument for the case
x = a is the same, except for reversing the role of the the sequences k and m.
Since φ(P 1) = a we have that necessarily |D(a, P 1)| ≥ k1 and therefore
k1 < k0.
Let Q1 be a profile identical to P 1 on I1, identical to P
1 on a subset of D(a, P 1) with
cardinality k1, and reporting b as the top choice of the remaining m1 − 1 voters.
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For the new profile Q1 we have φ(Q1) = a, and also Q1 ∈ P1 \P0. The latter implies
7 that
m1 ≤ m0.
CLAIM: onP0∪P1 the scfs φ and the scf ψ〈ℓ,k〉,x (= ψ1), where ℓ = (ℓ0, ℓ1) and k = (k0, k1),
coincide.
Indeed, let us consider a profile P ∈ P1 \P0. We have to show that
P ∈ Pa(ℓ1, k1)⇒ φ(P ) = a and P ∈ Pb(ℓ1, k1)⇒ φ(P ) = b.
We show the first implication only. Applying Proposition 3.4 we can find a permutation
σ of V such that P ∈ Pa(σ(I1), σ(F1)), namely such that the profile (P ◦ σ) belongs to
Pa(I1,F1). By Definition 3.3 2., (+) and strategy-proofness, we have that φ(P ◦ σ) = a.
By anonymity we get φ(P ) = a.
Now it is clear that if the set of profiles {P /∈ (P0∪P1) : φ(P ) 6= x} is empty, the theorem
is proved, being ℓ = (ℓ0, ℓ1) and k = (k0, k1) the desired sequences.
If the set {P /∈ (P0 ∪P1) : φ(P ) 6= x} is nonempty, we shall apply the Lemma 3.12 below,
which is really the induction step.We apply repeatedly Lemma 3.12 till we stop, that is,
when {P /∈ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr) : φ(P ) 6= x} is empty reaching the desired representation. ✷
Lemma 3.12 Let φ be a scf which is onto, anonymous, non-manipulable, and assigns
x ∈ {a, b} to the profile in which all agents are indifferent. Let the sequences ℓλ, kλ and mλ
(for λ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , r − 1}) be such that
0 ≤ ℓλ < n, 1 ≤ kλ ≤ n− ℓλ, mλ = n− ℓλ − kλ + 1.
Assume further that ℓ0 = 0, ℓλ is strictly increasing, and
A1 for every 1 ≤ λ ≤ r−1, there is a profile P λ ∈ Pλ\(P0∪· · ·∪Pλ−1) with: φ(P
λ) 6= x;
Iλ := I(P
λ); ℓλ = |Iλ| = min{|I(P )| : P /∈ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pλ−1), φ(P ) 6= x},
A2 in case x = b (respectively, x = a), kλ is strictly decreasing, mλ is decreasing (respec-
tively, kλ is decreasing, mλ is strictly decreasing)
A3 φ = ψr−1 on P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr−1
A4 {P /∈ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr−1) : φ(P ) 6= x} is nonempty.
Then we can find ℓr > ℓr−1, kr < kr−1, mr ≤ mr−1 (in case x = b, otherwise for x = a
we shall have kr ≤ kr−1, mr < mr−1), and a profile P
r ∈ Pr \ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪ Pr−1) with
φ(P r) 6= x, such that
|I(P r)| = ℓr = min{|I(P )| : P /∈ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr−1), φ(P ) 6= x}, and
φ = ψr on P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr.
7If we assume that Q1 ∈ P0, then ψ0(Q
1) = a. Hence necessarily Q1 ∈ Pa(ℓ0, k0). This leads to
k1 ≥ k0 wich is false.
Having seen that Q1 /∈ P0, also Q
1 /∈ Pb(ℓ0, k0), namely we have |D(b,Q
1)| < m0 hence m1− 1 ≤ m0− 1.
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proof: Notice that whenever P is a profile with I(P ) = Iλ, we necessarily have P ∈ Pλ.
Now, using A4, let P r be a profile in {P /∈ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr−1) : φ(P ) 6= x} with I(P
r) =: Ir
of smallest cardinality, that we denote by ℓr. By definition ℓr−1 ≤ ℓr < n.
CLAIM 1: ℓr−1 < ℓr.
Suppose the contrary, i.e. that ℓr−1 = ℓr. Let σ be a permutation of V that maps Ir−1
onto Ir. Since for the profile P
r ◦ σ we have I(P r ◦ σ) = Ir−1, certainly we also have that
P r ◦ σ ∈ P(ℓr−1, kr−1). Hence P
r ∈ P(ℓr−1, kr−1), against the definition of P
r. ✷
Applying Proposition 3.10 to the scf defined for the society Icr as follows:
PIcr −→ φ([∼Ir , PIcr ]),
we determine a SSCF Fr on I
c
r of cardinal type kr (with respect to I
c
r) such that, with
mr = n− ℓr − kr + 1,
(+) |D(a, P )∩ Icr | ≥ kr ⇒ φ([∼Ir , PIcr ]) = a, and |D(b, P )∩ I
c
r | ≥ mr ⇒ φ([∼Ir , PIcr ]) = b.
Set Pr = P(ℓr, kr).
Notice that whenever we have I(P ) = Ir, necessarily it is true that P ∈ Pr. Hence
P r ∈ Pr \ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr−1).
Claims 2 and 3 below, refers to x = b. For the case x = a just reverse the role of k’s and
m’s first proving mr < mr−1, then kr ≤ kr−1.
CLAIM 2: kr < kr−1.
Let us suppose on the contrary that kr ≥ kr−1. Since φ(P
r) = a, we have necessarily that
|D(a, P r)| ≥ kr. Hence we have |D(a, P
r)| ≥ kr−1. Showing also that |D(b, P
r)| < mr−1,
we have P r ∈ Pr−1 which is a contradiction. For our purpose it is enough to use CLAIM
1. Indeed we can write: |D(b, P r)| ≤ n− ℓr − kr < n− ℓr−1 − kr−1 < mr−1. ✷
CLAIM 3: mr ≤ mr−1.
Again by contradiction assume that mr > mr−1.
Let Qr be a profile identical to P r on Ir, identical to P
r on a subset of D(a, P r) with
cardinality exactly kr, and reporting b as the top choice of the remaining mr − 1 voters.
For the new profile Qr we have φ(Qr) = a.
Now, sincemr−1 ≥ mr−1, we have |D(b, Q
r)| = mr−1 ≥ mr−1. But also, |D(a,Q
r)| = kr <
kr−1, hence Q
r ∈ Pb(ℓr−1, kr−1). Because of the monotonicity of k, for every λ < r − 1,
the profile Qr /∈ Pa(ℓλ, kλ). Hence, by the assumption A3 we have that φ(Q
r) = b, a
contradiction. ✷
We shall finally prove that on the set P0 ∪ · · · ∪Pr of profiles, the two scfs φ and ψr are
identical.
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For this purpose, let us consider a profile P ∈ Pr \ (P0 ∪ · · · ∪ Pr−1). We have to show
that
P ∈ Pa(ℓr, kr)⇒ φ(P ) = a and P ∈ Pb(ℓr, kr)⇒ φ(P ) = b.
We show the first implication only. Applying Proposition 3.4 we can find a permutation
σ of V such that P ∈ Pa(σ(Ir), σ(Fr)), namely such that the profile (P ◦ σ) belongs to
Pa(Ir,Fr). By Definition 3.3, (+) and strategy-proofness, we have that φ(P ◦ σ) = a. By
anonymity we get φ(P ) = a. ✷
Completion of the proof of Theorems 2.4 and 2.7:
Now, if we start with an onto, anonymous, non-manipulable, binary scf φ, applying Theo-
rem 3.11, Proposition 3.8, and Remark 3.9 in this sequence gives us the proof of Theorem
2.4.
Theorem 2.7 follows from Proposition 3.2. ✷
Remark 3.13 If in Theorem 3.11 we had that the sequence ℓ+k is strictly increasing, we
would have obtained the proper representation directly by means of Proposition 3.8. But
in general, it is possible that ℓ+ k is not strictly increasing. A relevant example is the scf
φ of Example 2.13.
According to Proposition 3.8, from the procedure of the proof of Theorem 3.11, we get for
the mentioned φ the sequence (5, 5, 5, 4, 5, 3, 5, 2, 12), where ℓ+k is constantly 5. We shall
show this below.
Computing ℓ and k: ℓ0 = 0 and k0 = 5 are easily obtained by the restriction to strict
profiles. It is obvious that {P /∈ P0 : φ(P ) 6= b} is nonempty and consists of the profiles P
for which 2 ≤ |D(a, P )| < 5& |D(b, P )| < 7. Therefore ℓ1 = 1.
Considering the restriction φ(∼1, P{2,...,11}) on the society {2, . . . , 11}, we get that k1 = 4,
and consequently m1 = 7.
Hence, {P /∈ P0 ∪ P1 : φ(P ) 6= b} consists of the profiles P for which 2 ≤ |D(a, P )| <
4& |D(b, P )| < 7. Therefore ℓ2 = 2.
Considering the restriction φ(∼{1,2} P{3,...,11}) on the society {3, . . . , 11}, we get that k2 = 3,
and m2 = 7.
Hence, {P /∈ P0∪P1∪P2 : φ(P ) 6= b} consists of the profiles P for which 2 ≤ |D(a, P )| <
3& |D(b, P )| < 7. We conclude by determining ℓ3 = 3, k3 = 2, m3 = 7. ✷
The proper representation of φ is given by (5,2,12).
4 Comparison with Lahiri and Pramanik representa-
tion
In [5], Lahiri and Pramanik show that the anonymous, onto, non-manipulable scfs are (all
and only) quota rules either with indifference default a, denoted by f r,xa , or with indifference
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default b, denoted by f
r,y
b .
In the above notation Lahiri and Pramanik assume that r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, x,y are r-
dimensional vectors such that
• xi ≤ xi+1 ≤ xi + 1, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}
• x ∈ {1} × {1, 2} × · · · × {1, . . . r}
• yi ≤ yi+1 ≤ yi + 1, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}
• y ∈ {(n− r) + 1} × {(n− r) + 1, (n− r) + 2} × · · · × {(n− r) + 1, (n− r) + 2, . . . n}.
The quota rules can be described as in the table below (compare with [5, Definitions 10
and 11])
Cardinality of I(P ) Collective choice f r,xa (P ) Collective choice f
r,y
b (P )
r, or more a b
r − 1 a, if |D(a, P )| ≥ x1, otherwise b b, if |D(b, P )| ≥ y
′
1, otherwise a
r − 2 a, if |D(a, P )| ≥ x2, otherwise b b, if |D(a, P )| ≥ y
′
2, otherwise a
r − 3 a, if |D(a, P )| ≥ x3, otherwise b b, if |D(a, P )| ≥ y
′
3, otherwise a
... ... ...
r − i a, if |D(a, P )| ≥ xi, otherwise b b, if |D(a, P )| ≥ y
′
i, otherwise a
... ... ...
1 a, if |D(a, P )| ≥ xr−1, otherwise b b, if |D(a, P )| ≥ y
′
r−1, otherwise a
0 a, if |D(a, P )| ≥ xr, otherwise b b, if |D(a, P )| ≥ y
′
r, otherwise a
where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, we have set, for symmetry, y′i = (n− r+1)− yi+ i ∈ {i, i− 1, . . . , 1}.
Notice that, similarly to x, for y′ we have
• y′ ∈ {1} × {1, 2} × · · · × {1, . . . r} (and y′i ≤ y
′
i+1 ≤ y
′
i + 1, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}).
Also observe that xr corresponds to k0 in our representation.
The difference between Lahiri and Pramanik representation and ours is evident. Moreover
the final example shows that our representation theorem is simpler, involving a smaller
number of parameters.
Given a scf φ, anonymous and non-manipulable, after determining the indifference quota
r that indisputably gives rise to the default collective choice, Lahiri and Pramanik have
to discuss all cases r > |(I(P )| ≥ 0, by means of the further parameters x[r−|I(P )|] in case
default is a ( y′[r−|I(P )|], for default b).
Using an approach different from that of Lahiri and Pramanik [5], we have provided an
algorithm that produces a unique, up and down, sequence of majority quotas, that applied
in the given order gives back the scf φ.
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Example 2.13 continued. For the scf φ of this example, we know that our proper
representation formula gives φ = φ(5,2,12). Let us determine the representation of φ as
φ = f
r,y
b , according to Lahiri and Pramanik [5]. We need to determine r and the vector y.
It is clear that r = 10. Hence we have that y has dimension 10, and, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 10},
we have yi = i+ 2− y
′
i where
(y′1, y
′
2, . . . , y
′
7) = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) and (y
′
8, y
′
9, y
′
10) = (7, 7, 7).
Finally
y = (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Notice that other choices for (y′8, y
′
9, y
′
10) are possible, so that the Lahiri and Pramanik
representation is not unique, contrary to ours.
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